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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 721 (1991)

1. It will be recalled that resolution 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991, which was adopted unanimously, reads, in its operative part, as follows:

> "The Security Council,
>
> ...
>
> 1. Approves the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy and expresses the hope that they will pursue their contacts with the Yugoslav parties, as rapidly as possible, so that the Secretary-General can present early recommendations to the Security Council including for the possible establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia;
>
> 2. Endorses the statement made by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General to the parties that the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation cannot be envisaged without, inter alia, full compliance by all parties with the agreement signed in Geneva on 23 November 1991 and annexed to the letter of the Secretary-General (S/23239);
>
> 3. Strongly urges the Yugoslav parties to comply fully with that agreement;
>
> 4. Undertakes to examine and take appropriate action without delay upon the recommendations of the Secretary-General mentioned above, including in particular any recommendation for the possible establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia;
>
> 5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved."

2. Following the adoption of resolution 721 (1991) I asked my Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, to travel once again to Yugoslavia on my behalf.

He did so and remained in Yugoslavia from 1 to 9 December 1991. Once again, as was the case on two of his earlier missions, Mr. Vance and his party travelled on a special aircraft generously made available by the Government of Switzerland. I wish to express here my profound appreciation for this further gesture of support on the part of Switzerland for the work of the Organization. The composition of the official party that accompanied Mr. Vance on this occasion, together with the programme of the mission, are set out in annex I to the present report. This was Mr. Vance's fourth mission to the area since the adoption of Security Council resolution 713 (1991) on 25 September 1991. His first mission had taken place from 11 to 18 October 1991 and is described in my report (S/23169) of 25 October 1991 to the Council. His second mission spanned the period from 3 to 9 November 1991 and on 11 November I provided an informal briefing to the members of the Security Council about its outcome. The third mission extended from 17 to 24 November 1991 and by a letter which I subsequently addressed to the President of the Security Council on 24 November (S/23239), I reported thereon to the Council. It was during that mission that the Geneva Agreement, which is appended to that letter, was signed on 23 November 1991.

3. The main purpose of Mr. Vance's most recent visit to Yugoslavia was twofold: first, to urge the three Yugoslav parties to the Geneva Agreement of 23 November to comply fully with the commitments into which they had entered on that occasion; and, second, to carry forward with the same parties discussions which he and Under-Secretary-General Goulding had initiated during the preceding mission, with a view to defining a concept and operational plan for a peace-keeping operation which would be acceptable to the parties, and which I might recommend to the Security Council if the conditions existed for the establishment of a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. At the same time as Mr. Vance's mission, a small team led by the Director of Field Operations Division visited Yugoslavia to undertake a preliminary examination of the logistical environment in the country.

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT OF 23 NOVEMBER 1991

4. In connection with the implementation of the Geneva Agreement, Mr. Vance focused in his discussions in Yugoslavia on the lifting by Croatia of the remaining blockade of Yugoslav National Army (JNA) barracks and installations inside Croatia and the withdrawal from that Republic of the personnel, weapons and military equipment in those barracks and installations. He urged all parties most strongly to give effect to the unconditional cease-fire to which they had agreed at Geneva. Additionally, he gave serious attention to the humanitarian situation in the country and urged that humanitarian assistance be provided as fully and rapidly as possible - particularly to displaced persons.

A. Unblocking and withdrawal of JNA units in Croatia

5. Following the signature of the Geneva Agreement on 23 November, the unblocking of the hitherto blockaded JNA barracks and facilities in Croatia and the withdrawal from Croatia of unblocked personnel, weapons and military equipment had proceeded at a somewhat quickened pace. This process was, however, still attended by difficulties and these were apparent at the Marshall Tito barracks in Zagreb and at other military bases/facilities, especially in the port of Split. As a result of the latter difficulties, Mr. Vance asked his Special Adviser, Ambassador Herbert S. Okun, to travel ahead to Zagreb in an effort to assist the parties in the process, and this he did on 26 November. On 29/30 November, Ambassador Okun visited the blockaded facilities at Split together with the head of the European Community-led Monitor Mission, Ambassador Dirk van Houten. Subsequently, a very serious difficulty arose when, on 3 December, the ZMAJ military aircraft repair and maintenance facility of JNA, located on the outskirts of Zagreb, was blockaded.

6. Following his own arrival in Yugoslavia, Mr. Vance was informed by both the JNA leadership and by the Croatian authorities that the difficulties over the future disposition of plant and equipment at the ZMAJ facility represented a potential breaking point in the entire process. On 6 December, Ambassador Okun, who had by that time joined Mr. Vance at Belgrade, was once again dispatched to Zagreb to help to resolve the difficulties over ZMAJ. During the next 48 hours, he was in touch with all concerned parties, including the leadership of the ZMAJ and other facilities. Thanks to the round-the-clock work of Ambassador Okun, Ambassador van Houten and others, I was advised on 8 December that the parties had reached full agreement at Zagreb resolving all outstanding issues with respect to the lifting of the blockade of all JNA facilities in Croatia and the relocation of all JNA personnel and equipment involved. A facsimile reproduction of the text of the joint statement of 8 December is attached to the present report as annex II.

B. The unconditional cease-fire

7. In the days following the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991, there arose an increased level of hope that the cease-fire agreed to on that occasion would take hold. That hope was sustained by a certain reduction in the incidence of armed exchanges. During the week of 25 November, however, there took place a number of artillery and other attacks against various points in Croatia. At the same time, as indicated in paragraph 6 above, the unblocking/withdrawal process slowed down. In this connection, Mr. Vance was informed by senior defence officials at Belgrade of their view that these two developments were linked. In this period Mr. Vance continued to urge full resumption and the earliest conclusion of the process of unblocking and withdrawal, while on the other hand stressing the need for full and immediate implementation of the cease-fire agreement. None the less, in those days, a number of artillery and rocket attacks were launched against parts of eastern Slavonia in the Republic of Croatia, and especially on the town of Osijek and its hinterland. Then, in addition to a further attack on Osijek there took

place, at almost precisely the same moment on 6 December, a deeply shocking artillery attack on the civilian population in the historic centre of Dubrovnik. Mr. Vance, who was in Sarajevo when he learned of these developments, immediately protested against these outrageous acts to the Federal Secretary for National Defence, for he could see no possible justification for them. I myself reiterated these sentiments in a public statement issued in New York on the same day. It remains unclear as to whether the two above-mentioned attacks were linked. Subsequently, there have been armed clashes on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, including again in eastern Slavonia, and in western Slavonia. There have in the past two weeks also been credible reports of tactical advances by regular military units of JNA and by Serbian irregular armed groups in the direction of Osijek, in violation of the unconditional cease-fire agreement. Meanwhile Croatian forces have for their part been accused by JNA of numerous provocative violations of the cease-fire agreement. At least some of these charges are not without foundation. It is the view of my Personal Envoy that all sides, and especially the irregular forces, have been wanting in observing the Geneva Agreement in respect of the cease-fire. It also appears to be the case that the cease-fire violations by JNA have been more numerous and certainly more violent.

C. Humanitarian aspects of the Geneva Agreement

8. The humanitarian aspect of the Geneva Agreement is addressed in paragraphs 15 to 20 below.

II. FEASIBILITY OF A PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

9. As stated above, the second purpose of Mr. Vance's most recent mission to Yugoslavia was to pursue discussion of the feasibility of a United Nations peace-keeping operation there.

10. It will be recalled from my letter of 24 November 1991 to the President of the Security Council (S/23239) that during his previous mission, from 17 to 23 November 1991, Mr. Vance had been told by the Yugoslav participants at the meeting convened at Geneva on 23 November 1991, namely Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, President of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, President of the Republic of Croatia, and General Valkjo Kadijevic, Secretary of State for National Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that they wanted to see the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation as soon as possible; they had generally welcomed a possible concept for such an operation, its mandate, its organization and the areas where it would be deployed, which had been put forward in preliminary form by Mr. Vance in Geneva.

11. During his most recent mission, in the course of further meetings with the above-mentioned leaders, as well as with a number of other personalities, including Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Republic of

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Vance and Mr. Goulding further defined and elaborated the concept which they had put forward at Geneva. Their basic approach was to concentrate a United Nations peace-keeping force in those areas of Croatia in which Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter-communal tensions have led to armed conflict in the recent past. It was hoped that by thus tackling the heart of the fires which have recently blazed in Yugoslavia, a further spread of the conflagration could be avoided and the necessary conditions created for successful negotiations on an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

12. On this basis, United Nations troops and police monitors would be deployed in these areas, which would be designated as "United Nations Protected Areas" (UNPAs). They would be demilitarized and all armed forces in them would be either withdrawn or disbanded. The role of the United Nations troops would be to ensure that the areas remained demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack. The role of the United Nations police monitors would be to ensure that the local police forces carried out their duties without discriminating against persons of any nationality or abusing anyone's human rights. As the United Nations Force assumed its responsibilities in the UNPAs, all of the JNA forces deployed elsewhere in Croatia would be relocated outside the Republic. The United Nations Force would also, as appropriate, assist the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations in the return of all displaced persons who so desired to their homes in the UNPAs.

13. All aspects of this concept were discussed at length by Mr. Vance and Mr. Goulding with their interlocutors. By the end of their visit, they were in a position to prepare a working paper which described in some detail the concept and an operational plan for putting it into effect which had emerged from the discussions, and with which their three principal interlocutors had all expressed a wide measure of agreement. Copies of this paper, the text of which is contained in annex III to the present report, were given to Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman and to General Kadijevic on 8 December 1991. Initial reactions which Mr. Vance received from them before he left Yugoslavia confirmed their support for his approach. However, it has become clear, both from his discussions with other interlocutors and from statements to the press, that at least one leader of the Serbian communities in Croatia was not at that time able to accept all aspects of the concept and operational plan.

14. Throughout his discussions, Mr. Vance made it clear to his interlocutors that he had not yet decided whether to advise me that the necessary conditions existed for the establishment of a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. He said that his decision would continue to depend on sustained evidence that the Yugoslav participants at the meeting at Geneva on 23 November 1991 were seriously implementing all aspects of the agreement signed on that occasion. It would also depend on his receiving from those participants categorical assurances that all concerned would accept an operation on the lines discussed and that they would give it the cooperation it would require to carry out its mandate. For the reason described in the preceding paragraph, the assurances sought from President Milosevic would be especially important in this regard.

III. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

15. The humanitarian dimensions of the Yugoslavia problem, on which I dwelt at some length in my report of 25 October 1991 (S/23169), have continued to grow. The number of persons displaced by the conflict now exceeds 500,000 and is increasing still. Two thirds of the displaced persons are women and children. Indigenous resources for assistance to this population are rapidly being depleted, and the local hospitality which to date has permitted the placement of well over half of the displaced persons with host families is eroding. The ever more difficult economic situation, shortages, the high cost of certain basic household items and of fuel, as well as rising unemployment, and the onset of winter are likely to compel even more displaced persons to seek shelter in collective facilities. Although most of the displaced remain within the frontiers of Yugoslavia's six Republics, a growing number have sought refuge in other countries, in particular in Hungary, which now hosts over 40,000 persons.

16. In response to a request on my part, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has taken the lead in coordinating humanitarian assistance of the United Nations system to the displaced within Yugoslavia. A joint funding appeal for an initial six-month programme, valued at US$ 24.3 million, was issued by the High Commissioner on 3 December 1991, covering the coordinated programmes of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ($16.47 million), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) ($5.11 million), and the World Health Organization ($2.72 million). The United Nations programme will be implemented in close cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross. The assistance foreseen consists, in the first stage, of staple food and household items, essential medicines and medical equipment, infant and children's foods, child-care articles, educational support, and specialized care for persons suffering from war-related trauma. UNHCR is delivering emergency aid in December in the form of blankets and basic foodstuffs, while the programme outlined in the joint appeal will be implemented as from 1 January 1992. Although aid from bilateral, multilateral and private sources is flowing into various parts of Yugoslavia, prolongation of the conflict and the spectre of even larger displacement make imperative an early and strong donor response to the coordinated United Nations assistance programme. For its part, UNICEF has in particular been active at Dubrovnik, where a senior official has been present throughout the past weeks.

17. Alongside the provision of material assistance, attention must be devoted to the protection of the displaced population. Incidents of detention of displaced persons, of organized movements of displaced persons into areas from which others have fled and of pressure on specific groups to evacuate certain villages or towns have given rise to serious concern. Mr. Vance raised this matter with his interlocutors, including with President Milosevic on 2 December and again on 5 December. A full and detailed response to his enquiries is awaited. The impossibility for many displaced persons to avail themselves of their acquired rights (such as pensions or other social benefits) limits their ability to be self-reliant and places additional

burdens on the local authorities and on the international community. Prospects for displaced persons to avail themselves of the right to return to their homes seem in many areas to be dim. In addition, the very nature of the war makes the delivery of assistance to civilian victims of the conflict in some areas difficult or impossible.

18. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) now has some 50 delegates based at Belgrade, Dubrovnik, Ljubljana, Osijek (Slavonia), Rijeka, Split and Zagreb. Since mid-October 1991, ICRC has participated in a multilateral negotiating commission, meeting almost daily at Zagreb to discuss, among other issues, the release of prisoners and the protection of the civilian population. On 9 November, more than 700 prisoners were released simultaneously by the two parties to the present conflict in Bosanski Samac (Bosnia Herzogovina) under ICRC supervision. Then, following an agreement reached at Zagreb on 8 December between the Croatian Government and the Federal Army, under the auspices of ICRC, the simultaneous liberation of 1,600 prisoners was to have taken place on 10 December 1991.

19. At the invitation of ICRC, plenipotentiary representatives of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Army met at Geneva on 26 and 27 November 1991 and made a common reaffirmation of their willingness and intention to apply the provisions of international humanitarian law.

20. Other activities being carried out at present by ICRC in Yugoslavia include visits to some 4,000 prisoners, the operation of a tracing agency, the provision of relief supplies to displaced persons, the operation of two relief ships on the Dalmatian Coast, the provision of medical aid and, as indicated above, the promotion of respect for humanitarian principles and for the Red Cross emblem.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

21. The conditions for establishing a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia still do not exist. The Security Council in its resolution 721 (1991) underscored the position expressed by Mr. Vance that such an operation could not be envisaged without full compliance by the parties with the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991. In this connection, it is important to note that while the process of unblocking and withdrawal from Croatia of those JNA units hitherto blockaded is at present proceeding, the unconditional cease-fire remains unimplemented. As regards the humanitarian aspects of the agreement, the situation is addressed in paragraphs 15 to 20 above.

22. In the circumstances prevailing today, there is a most urgent need for the three Yugoslav parties who signed the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991 (namely President Milosevic of the Republic of Serbia, President Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia and General Kadijevic, Federal Secretary for National Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) to ensure full compliance with the terms of that agreement. This is not only required of

them by virtue of their signatures on the document, it is also essential in order to facilitate the resumption of the political negotiations for a peaceful resolution to the problems of Yugoslavia and her peoples.

23. In the period immediately ahead, the parties must - as confirmed most recently in the Zagreb Joint Statement of 8 December 1991 - complete expeditiously the unblocking of all remaining JNA barracks and facilities in Croatia and the relocation of blockaded personnel and military equipment to points outside that Republic. The parties need also to observe, and to ensure that all others observe, the agreed unconditional cease-fire. An effective cease-fire as an essential precondition for the deployment of a peace-keeping operation does not mean that random and occasional violations of the cease-fire would rule out such an operation. What it does mean is that before I could recommend that the Security Council take so expensive and innovative a step, there would have to be sustained evidence that the Yugoslav leaders are willing and able to implement agreements which they have signed. Indeed, I see no reason for further cease-fire agreements in the present conflict. What is needed is immediate and continuing compliance with commitments already entered into by the parties. The Security Council may wish to consider ways by which it would seek to ensure such compliance.

24. Full compliance with the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991 would permit accelerated consideration of the question of establishing a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. I believe that a solid basis for such consideration is provided by the Concept Paper which is attached to the present report as annex III and which has met with a wide measure of agreement from the parties to the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991. In the meantime, I and my Personal Envoy await the assurances which we have sought in particular from President Milosevic, that all presently armed elements would extend full support to the kind of peace-keeping operation described in the Concept Paper. The importance of this consideration cannot be over-emphasized.

25. A soundly-based and effective cease-fire would further open the way for constructive negotiations between the representatives of the Republics. In this respect, the Conference on Yugoslavia, under the Chairmanship of Lord Carrington, enjoys the full support of the Security Council, as reflected in resolution 713 (1991). The Conference has been adjourned since 5 November, although Lord Carrington held an informal stock-taking session with the Presidents of Yugoslavia's six republics on 9 December. The Conference, it will be recalled, is guided by a number of considerations, including those set forth in the Declaration issued by the Twelve member States of the European Community at Rome on 8 November 1991 (S/23203). That declaration stated inter alia that "the prospect of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it can only be envisaged in the framework of an overall settlement". The Conference has also, with the agreement of its participants, ruled out any changes in external or internal borders by means of force. I believe that any selective, uncoordinated departure from those principles could hold very serious dangers, not only for the republics of Yugoslavia, but for all of her peoples and indeed for the maintenance of peace and security in

the region. It was in this connection that, on 10 December 1991, I addressed a letter to the current President of the Council of Ministers of the European Community, Foreign Minister van den Broek of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the text of which is reproduced as annex IV to the present report.

26. It seems clear that the peoples and Republics of Yugoslavia will continue for a considerable time to suffer the adverse consequences of the conflict, even if there is an early end to the present hostilities. Even in that event, the effect of the conflict on the domestic economy and on future relations with traditional trading partners will be long-lasting. These consequences will of course be greatly magnified by continued fighting.

27. The general situation in Yugoslavia continues to worsen. The crisis in the humanitarian area in particular is deepening. In this respect, I strongly urge Governments to respond positively to the appeal that has been made on my behalf by the High Commissioner for Refugees for the joint humanitarian programme being coordinated by her Office. The present conflict and its attendant suffering can be brought to an end, if there is sufficient political will among the country's senior political and military leaders. The international community, already responding to many crises elsewhere has been, and is, I believe, prepared to assist the Yugoslav peoples if the conditions described in this report are met. It is my most sincere hope that the Yugoslav political and military authorities will grasp the opportunity afforded by such readiness.

28. I and my Personal Envoy will remain actively seized of this matter and, with his most valued collaboration, I shall keep the Security Council informed of developments, in particular as to whether the unconditional cease-fire envisaged in Geneva on 23 November 1991 is taking hold effectively.

Annex I

Fourth mission to Yugoslavia of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, the Honourable Cyrus R. Vance

(1-9 December 1991)

A. Composition of the official party

1. The mission was led by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, the Honourable Cyrus R. Vance, and comprised also the following members:

Mr. Marrack Goulding
Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

Ambassador Herbert S. Okun
Special Adviser to the Personal Envoy

Mr. J. P. Kavanagh
Senior Officer
Executive Office of the Secretary-General

Colonel H. Purola
Deputy Military Adviser to the Secretary-General

Mr. H. Heitmann
Political Affairs Officer
Office for the Research and Collection of Information

2. Further United Nations Secretariat staff members participating in the mission were: Miss Susan Dicey, Social Sciences Assistant; Mr. Robert Balzer, Operations Officer, and Mr. Ernesto Triana and Mr. John Linehan, Communications Officers.

B. Programme of meetings during the Fourth Vance Mission

Monday, 2 December 1991 (Belgrade)

1000 General V. Kadijevic, Federal Secretary for National Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

1200 Mr. S. Milosevic, President of the Republic of Serbia

1700 Dr. R. Karadzic, President of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Tuesday, 3 December 1991 (Osijek)

1100 Briefing by JNA Commander of Novi Sad Corps, General B. Andpije, at his headquarters in Dalj

1230 Visit to Osijek and briefing by the Mayor, Professor Dr. Z. Kramaric and tour of city

1545 Further meeting with JNA officers at Dalj

Wednesday, 4 December 1991 (Belgrade/Zagreb)

0900 General V. Kadijevic

1540 Mr. F. Tudjman, President of the Republic of Croatia

1715 Dr. H. Kacic, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs

1825 Dr. M. Granic, Vice-President of the Republic of Croatia

1915 Ambassador Dirk Jan van Houten, Head of the EC-led Monitor Mission

2100 Mr. F. Greguric, Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia

Thursday, 5 December 1991 (Belgrade)

1500 President S. Milosevic

1650 General V. Kadijevic

1800 (Mr. Goulding met with Messrs. Babic and Hadjic, Serb leaders from Krajina and Eastern Slavonia respectively)

1810 Mr. A. Markovic, Federal Prime Minister

Friday, 6 December 1991 (Sarajevo/Belgrade)

1000 Mr. A. Izetbegovic, President of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

1115 Mr. S. Kljuic, President of the Democratic Croat Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina

1155 Simultaneous meeting with Messrs. Karadjic and Kljuic, and with Mr. R. Mahmutcehadic, President of the Democratic Action Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina

1300 President A. Izetbegovic

1600 Ambassador Siegel of Austria
approx.

1700 Ambassador Eiff of Germany
approx.

1800 Mr. M. Mendiluce, UNHCR Coordinator for Yugoslavia
approx.

1900 President S. Milosevic

Saturday, 7 December 1991 (Belgrade)

1000 Mr. K. Gligorov, President of Macedonia

1715 President S. Milosevic

1830 General V. Kadijevic

Sunday, 8 December 1991

1400 Mr. B. Loncar, Acting Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Work on report to Secretary-General

N.B. As indicated in the body of the present report, Ambassador Herbert S. Okun, Special Adviser to the Personal Envoy, was engaged throughout the period 6 to 8 December in a negotiation at Zagreb with all concerned parties regarding the unblocking of all remaining JNA facilities in Croatia.

Annex II

Joint statement by Dr. M. Granic, Vice-President of the Republic of Croatia, and General A. Raseta, Commanding General of the 5th Army District of the Yugoslav National Army, issued at Zagreb on 8 December 1991

We, the undersigned, meeting today, Sunday, 8 December 1991, in Zagreb as plenipotentiaries for our respective parties, and after careful examination and discussion, have reached agreement with regard to all outstanding issues for implementation with immediate effect:

1. With regard to the barracks at Dugo Selo:

   - Completion of removal of mines;

   - Evacuation of the garrison and its relocation;

   Adequate transport capacity may be deployed to this end.

2. A formula for sharing facilities and equipment of the ZMAJ facility, thus permitting evacuation of servicemen and agreed equipment from the facility and from Pleso airbase. Combat aircraft currently undergoing servicing or otherwise located at the facility will also be free to leave. Adequate air cargo capacity will be allowed in to complete the evacuation.

3. A formula for sharing outstanding equipment at the Ivan Gosnjak Technical Training Centre, thus permitting its immediate evacuation.

4. Evacuation of the Military Hospital and its release to the Croatian authorities for treatment of all patients.

The parties further note that in addition to successful evacuation arrangements concluded for Sibenik and Pula, arrangements for Split are well in hand. They further noted that mine-clearing arrangements at the Marshall Tito barracks are well in hand.

With this agreement the parties concur that all outstanding issues have been resolved with respect to the blockade lifting of all Yugoslav National Army (JNA) facilities in Croatia and the relocation of all JNA personnel and equipment involved, as set out in the Hague Agreement of 18 October 1991 and the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991, as well as the Zagreb implementing Agreement of 22 November 1991.

Both parties wish to express their recognition of the roles played by Ambassador Dirk Jan van Houten and Ambassador Herbert S. Okun in helping to bring this agreement to its final, successful conclusion.

For the Republic of Croatia	For the Yugoslav Army
(Signed) Dr. Mate GRANIC	(Signed) General Andrija RASETA
Witnessed by	
(Signed) Ambassador Dirk Jan VAN HOUTEN	(Signed) Ambassador Herbert S. OKUN

Annex III

Concept for a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia, as discussed with Yugoslav leaders by the Honourable Cyrus R. Vance, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General and Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

November/December 1991

General principles

1. A United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia would be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. It would not prejudge the outcome of such negotiations.

2. The operation would be established by the United Nations Security Council, acting on a recommendation by the Secretary-General. Before making such a recommendation, the Secretary-General would need to be satisfied that all concerned in the conflict were, in a serious and sustained way, abiding by the arrangements, including an unconditional cease-fire, agreed at Geneva on 23 November 1991. He would also need to receive, through his Personal Envoy, categorical assurances that all the Yugoslav parties concerned in the conflict accepted the concept which he intended to recommend to the Security Council and that they would provide all necessary assistance and cooperation to enable the peace-keeping operation to carry out its functions.

3. The military and police personnel required for the operation would be contributed, on a voluntary basis in response to a request from the Secretary-General, by the Governments of Member States of the United Nations. The contributing States would be approved by the Security Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General after consultation with the Yugoslav parties.

4. All members of the peace-keeping operation would be under the operational command of the Secretary-General and would not be permitted to receive operational orders from the national authorities. They would be required to be completely impartial between the various parties to the conflict. Those personnel who were armed would have standing instructions to use force to the minimum extent necessary and normally only in self-defence.

5. In accordance with its normal practice, the Security Council would probably establish the operation for an initial period of six months. Subject to the Council's agreement, the operation would remain in Yugoslavia until a negotiated settlement of the conflict was achieved. The Secretary-General would submit regular reports to the Security Council, normally every six months. These reports would contain his recommendations on extension of the operation's mandate.

6. The operation would be financed collectively by the Member States of the United Nations. But the various Yugoslav authorities would be expected to make available to the United Nations, free of charge, as much as possible of the accommodation and other facilities and supplies, such as food and fuel, that would be required by the operation. They would also be asked to conclude with the United Nations agreements concerning the privileges, immunities and facilities which the operation and its members would need in order to carry out their functions, especially complete freedom of movement and communications.

Basic concept

7. United Nations troops and police monitors would be deployed in certain areas in Croatia, designated as "United Nations Protected Areas". These areas would be demilitarized; all armed forces in them would be either withdrawn or disbanded. The role of the United Nations troops would be to ensure that the areas remained demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack. The role of the United Nations police monitors would be to ensure that the local police forces carried out their duties without discriminating against persons of any nationality or abusing anyone's human rights. As the United Nations Force assumed its responsibilities in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), all JNA forces deployed elsewhere in Croatia would be relocated outside that republic. The United Nations Force would also, as appropriate, assist the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations in the return of all displaced persons who so desired to their homes in the UNPAs.

The United Nations Protected Areas

8. The UNPAs would be areas in Croatia in which the Secretary-General judged that special arrangements were required during an interim period to ensure that a lasting cease-fire was maintained. They would be areas in which Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter-communal tensions have led to armed conflict in the recent past. As already stated, the special arrangements in these areas would be of an interim nature and would not prejudge the outcome of political negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

9. There would be three UNPAs: Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina. They would comprise the following opstine or parts of opstine:

Eastern Slavonia:
- Beli Manastir
- Those parts of Osijek which lie east of Osijek city
- Vukovar
- Certain villages in the extreme eastern part of Vinkovci

Western Slavonia:	Grubisno Polje
	Daruvar
	Pakrac
	The western parts of Nova Gradiska
	The eastern parts of Novska
Krajina:	Kostajnica
	Petrinja
	Dvor
	Glina
	Vrgin Most
	Vojnic
	Slunj
	Titova Korenica
	Donji Lapac
	Gracac
	Obrovac
	Benkovac
	Knin

Before deployment of the Force began, the exact boundaries of the UNPAs would be decided by an advance party of the United Nations Force, after consulting local leaders.

The deployment and functions of the United Nations Force

10. The function of protecting the inhabitants of the UNPAs would be shared between the United Nations Force's infantry units and its civilian police monitors. The infantry would ensure that the UNPAs remained demilitarized. The police monitors would ensure that the local police carried out their duties without discrimination against any nationality and with full respect for the human rights of all residents of the UNPAs.

11. The infantry units would be deployed throughout the UNPAs. They would be lightly armed but would use armoured personnel carriers and helicopters. They would control access to the UNPAs by establishing check-points on all roads and principal tracks leading into them and at important junctions inside them. At these check-points they would stop and, if necessary, search vehicles and individuals to ensure that no military formations or armed groups entered the UNPAs and that no weapons, ammunition, explosives or other military equipment were brought into them. They would patrol extensively inside the UNPAs on foot, and by vehicle and helicopter. They would also investigate any complaints made to them about violations of the demilitarized status of the UNPAs. Any confirmed violations would be taken up with the offending party and would, if necessary, be reported by the Secretary-General to the Security Council. If serious tension were to develop between nationalities in a UNPA, the United Nations Force would interpose itself between the two sides in order to prevent hostilities.

12. The civilian police monitors would also be deployed throughout the UNPAs. They would be unarmed. They would have no executive responsibility for the maintenance of public order but they would closely monitor the work of the local police forces. To this end, they would be co-located with police headquarters in each region and opstina and would accompany the local police on their patrols and in their performance of their other duties. They would investigate any complaints of discrimination or other abuse of human rights and would report to the Chief of the United Nations Force any confirmed cases of discrimination or abuse. They would require free and immediate access to all premises and facilities of, or under the control of, the local police forces.

13. The United Nations Force would also include a group of military observers. They would be unarmed, in accordance with normal United Nations practice. They would initially be deployed in the UNPAs to verify the demilitarization of those areas. As soon as demilitarization had been effected, the military observers would be transferred to parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina adjacent to Croatia. Their functions there would be to patrol extensively, to liaise with the local authorities and to warn the Chief of the United Nations Force if inter-communal tension threatened to disturb the peace and tranquillity established by the Force in the UNPAs. Their good offices would be available to help resolve local difficulties and to investigate allegations of inter-communal tension or aggression. The exact locations in which the military observers would operate would be decided by the advance party of the United Nations Force, after consulting local authorities. There would also be a small detachment of military observers at Dubrovnik.

14. The military and police personnel of the United Nations Force would arrive in Yugoslavia as soon as possible after the Security Council decided to establish the Force. They would be deployed simultaneously in all three UNPAs. The Force's assumption of responsibility for the protection of these areas would be synchronized with the demilitarization process. To this end, close coordination would be required with the commanders of the forces currently deployed in each of the UNPAs and agreed timetables would be established in order to link deployment of the United Nations Force with the demilitarization of each area.

Demilitarization of the UNPAs

15. On the basis of the agreed timetables, demilitarization of the UNPAs would be implemented as rapidly as possible, in the following way:

(a) All units and personnel of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and the Croatian National Guard, as well as any Territorial Defence units or personnel not based in the UNPAs, would be withdrawn from them;

(b) All Territorial Defence units and personnel based in the UNPAs would be disbanded and demobilized. Disbandment would involve the temporary

dissolution of the units' command structures. Demobilization would mean that the personnel involved would cease to wear any uniform or carry any weapons, though they could continue to be paid by the local authorities;

(c) The weapons of the Territorial Defence units and personnel based in the UNPAs would be handed over to units of JNA or the Croatian National Guard, as the case might be, before those units withdrew from the UNPAs. Alternatively, they could be handed over to the United Nations Force for safe custody during the interim period, if that arrangement was preferred by the units concerned;

(d) All paramilitary, irregular or volunteer units or personnel would either be withdrawn from the UNPAs or, if resident in them, be disbanded and demobilized.

16. It would be the responsibility of each unit, before it withdrew or was disbanded, to remove any mines which it had laid while deployed in the UNPAs.

17. The implementation of the above arrangements for demilitarization of the UNPAs would be verified by the United Nations Force.

Relocation of the Yugoslav National Army

18. In parallel with the assumption by the United Nations Force of its protective functions in the UNPAs, any JNA units deployed elsewhere in Croatia would be relocated to places outside that republic. A timetable for this relocation would be agreed between the Chief of the United Nations Force and the Federal Secretary for National Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. All Serbian territorial, paramilitary, irregular and volunteer units (other than those disbanded and demobilized in the UNPAs) would similarly withdraw from Croatia. These withdrawals would be verified by the military observers of the United Nations Force.

Local police forces

19. The maintenance of public order in the UNPAs would be the responsibility of local police forces who would carry only side-arms. Each of these forces would be formed from residents of the UNPA in question, in proportions reflecting the national composition of the population which lived in it before the recent hostilities. The local police forces would be responsible to the existing opstine councils in the UNPAs. Any existing regional police structures would remain in place, provided that they were consistent with the principle described above concerning the national composition of the local police forces.

Return of displaced persons to their homes

20. In accordance with established international principles, the United Nations policy is to facilitate the return to their homes of all persons displaced by the recent hostilities who so desire. The lead in this matter is being taken by the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations. If a United Nations Force were established in Yugoslavia, it would provide all appropriate support to this effort in the UNPAs. The United Nations police monitors would have an especially important role in this regard.

Organization of a United Nations Force

21. If a peace-keeping operation were established to carry out the above-described functions, it would be commanded by a civilian Chief of Mission who would receive his instructions from, and report to, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. As already stated, the Secretary-General would himself report regularly to the Security Council, whose guidance he would seek if any difficulties arose in implementation of the Force's mandate. Under the authority of the Chief of Mission, there would be a Force Commander, with the rank of Major General, who would command the military elements, and a Police Commissioner, who would command the civilian police monitors. The headquarters of the Force would be located at Banja Luka, with sub-offices at Belgrade and Zagreb.

22. To carry out the functions described above, the Force would require approximately 10 infantry battalions, 100 military observers and 500 police monitors, together with the necessary civilian and military support personnel. This would indicate a strength of somewhat over 10,000 persons.

Annex IV

Letter dated 10 December 1991 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

I wish to share with you concerns which I have in regard to the situation in Yugoslavia.

These concerns have been deepened by the report that I have just received from my Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, who returned last evening from a fourth mission to Yugoslavia. They have also been deepened by the outcome of yesterday's informal meeting of the Presidents of the six Yugoslav republics, which Lord Carrington convened at The Hague in his capacity as Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia.

I shall shortly be reporting to the Security Council on the outcome of Mr. Vance's mission. As far as a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia is concerned, difficulties persist - owing to the fact that the Geneva agreement of 23 November is not being fully implemented. A paper comprising a concept and operational plan of a potential peace-keeping operation has, however, been left with the principal parties by Mr. Vance. It has met with a wide measure of agreement from them.

In his report to me today, Mr. Vance has described widely expressed apprehensions about the possibility of premature recognition of the independence of some of the Yugoslav republics and the effect that such a move might have on the remaining republics. Leaders of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia were among the many political and military figures who last week underscored to Mr. Vance their own strong fears in this regard. More than one of his high-level interlocutors described the possibly explosive consequences of such a development as being a "potential time bomb".

Given these anxieties, I believe that the Twelve were correct when they reiterated, at their special European Political Cooperation Ministerial Meeting held at Rome on 8 November, that the prospect of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it, "can only be envisaged in the framework of an overall settlement ...". As we know, that overall settlement is being pursued by the Conference on Yugoslavia under the Chairmanship of Lord Carrington.

Let me be clear: I am not in any way calling into question the principle of self-determination which is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. However, I am deeply worried that any early, selective recognition could widen the present conflict and fuel an explosive situation especially in Bosnia-Hercegovina and also Macedonia; indeed, serious consequences could ensue for the entire Balkan region. I believe, therefore, that uncoordinated actions should be avoided.

I should be grateful if you could bring my concerns to the attention of your partners among the Twelve, given the particular responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

(Signed) Javier PEREZ DE CUELLAR